Historique
Périodique
Book review. The Taliban phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997, by Matinuddin, K
Auteur(s) :
A. U. H. AHADY
Article en page(s) :
586-588
Domaine :
Drogues illicites / Illicit drugs
Langue(s) :
Français
Discipline :
MAR (Marchés / Markets)
Thésaurus mots-clés
POLITIQUE
;
GUERRE
;
ARMEE
;
TRAFIC
;
FINANCEMENT
Thésaurus géographique
AFGHANISTAN
Note générale :
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2000, 32, (4), 586-588
Résumé :
ENGLISH :
In his book, Kamal Matinuddin does not offer a central thesis regarding Afghan politics or the Taliban movement. Rather, he discusses a number of important questions pertaining to the Taliban movement. [...] An important question about the Taliban is their sources of financial support. When the Taliban captured Herat in 1995, the Iranian press asserted that they were financially supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia. Matinuddin maintains that there is no evidence to support this claim. Matinuddin advances a plausible argument that the Taliban war machine is supported by profits from the smuggling of consumer goods and from drug trafficking. Many Afghan merchants import consumer goods into Afghanistan, then illegally export them to Pakistan and Central Asia. The volume of this illegal trade has increased tremendously in the past few years. Because the Taliban have provided security in Afghanistan, these merchants have benefited from their rule; consequently, they are supportive of the Talibans efforts to gain control over the entire country. Similarly, according to Matinuddin, while Afghanistan produces 60 percent of the worlds opium, 96 percent of Afghanistans opium is produced in the Taliban-controlled areas. The Taliban have imposed taxes on the production of opium and on its transportation throughout the areas that they control. Although it is very plausible that smuggling and drug trafficking constitute the major sources of the Talibans revenues, Matinuddin does not even estimate the amount that they receive from these sources. Furthermore, because Pakistan is the market for most of the smuggled consumer goods, one wonders why Pakistan tolerates such a large amount of smuggling by Afghan merchants. Assuming that smuggling is a major source of revenue for the Taliban, it would be reasonable to infer that Pakistans tolerance of such illegal trade is in fact indirect financial support for the Taliban. However, Matinuddin does not address these matters. [...] Overall, the book is informative for a fresh reader of the Taliban phenomenon and Afghan politics. The sections on the Islamic seminaries as a source of recruitment for the Taliban, the military encounters of the Taliban, and the Talibans main sources of income are useful even for the more informed readers of Afghan affairs. The bulk of the book is of little use to those who are familiar with Afghan politics and seek analysis of recent political developments in Afghanistan. (Extract of the publication)
ENGLISH :
In his book, Kamal Matinuddin does not offer a central thesis regarding Afghan politics or the Taliban movement. Rather, he discusses a number of important questions pertaining to the Taliban movement. [...] An important question about the Taliban is their sources of financial support. When the Taliban captured Herat in 1995, the Iranian press asserted that they were financially supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia. Matinuddin maintains that there is no evidence to support this claim. Matinuddin advances a plausible argument that the Taliban war machine is supported by profits from the smuggling of consumer goods and from drug trafficking. Many Afghan merchants import consumer goods into Afghanistan, then illegally export them to Pakistan and Central Asia. The volume of this illegal trade has increased tremendously in the past few years. Because the Taliban have provided security in Afghanistan, these merchants have benefited from their rule; consequently, they are supportive of the Talibans efforts to gain control over the entire country. Similarly, according to Matinuddin, while Afghanistan produces 60 percent of the worlds opium, 96 percent of Afghanistans opium is produced in the Taliban-controlled areas. The Taliban have imposed taxes on the production of opium and on its transportation throughout the areas that they control. Although it is very plausible that smuggling and drug trafficking constitute the major sources of the Talibans revenues, Matinuddin does not even estimate the amount that they receive from these sources. Furthermore, because Pakistan is the market for most of the smuggled consumer goods, one wonders why Pakistan tolerates such a large amount of smuggling by Afghan merchants. Assuming that smuggling is a major source of revenue for the Taliban, it would be reasonable to infer that Pakistans tolerance of such illegal trade is in fact indirect financial support for the Taliban. However, Matinuddin does not address these matters. [...] Overall, the book is informative for a fresh reader of the Taliban phenomenon and Afghan politics. The sections on the Islamic seminaries as a source of recruitment for the Taliban, the military encounters of the Taliban, and the Talibans main sources of income are useful even for the more informed readers of Afghan affairs. The bulk of the book is of little use to those who are familiar with Afghan politics and seek analysis of recent political developments in Afghanistan. (Extract of the publication)
Affiliation :
Dpt of Political Science, Providence College, Providence, R.I.
Etats-Unis. United States.
Etats-Unis. United States.
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