Historique
![Does tougher enforcement make drugs more expensive? [For debate]](https://bdoc.ofdt.fr/img_cache/pmb_ofdt_record_75074.webp?v=1771290003)
Article de Périodique
Does tougher enforcement make drugs more expensive? [For debate] (2014)
Auteur(s) :
POLLACK, H. A. (Auteur) ;
REUTER, P. (Auteur) ;
CAULKINS, J. P. (Auteur du commentaire) ;
MEJIA, D. (Auteur du commentaire) ;
FELBAB-BROWN, V. (Auteur du commentaire)
Année
2014
Page(s) :
1959-1966
Langue(s) :
Anglais
Refs biblio. :
45
Domaine :
Drogues illicites / Illicit drugs
Discipline :
MAR (Marchés / Markets)
Thésaurus mots-clés
PRODUIT ILLICITE
;
PRIX
;
REVENDEUR
;
MARCHE DE LA DROGUE
;
ECONOMIE
;
PROHIBITION
;
LUTTE
;
EVALUATION
;
ERADICATION
;
LEGISLATION
Note générale :
Commentaries:
- Diminishing returns and great potential: a comment on Pollack's & Reuter's review on tougher drug enforcement and prices. Caulkins J.P., p. 1967-1968.
- Yet another dimension of the ineffectiveness of supply-side interventions in illegal drug markets. Mejia D., p. 1968-1969.
- Calibrating law enforcement and its purpose. Felbab-Brown V., p. 1969-1970.
- Response to Commentaries. Pollack H., Reuter P., p. 1970-1971.
- Diminishing returns and great potential: a comment on Pollack's & Reuter's review on tougher drug enforcement and prices. Caulkins J.P., p. 1967-1968.
- Yet another dimension of the ineffectiveness of supply-side interventions in illegal drug markets. Mejia D., p. 1968-1969.
- Calibrating law enforcement and its purpose. Felbab-Brown V., p. 1969-1970.
- Response to Commentaries. Pollack H., Reuter P., p. 1970-1971.
Résumé :
Aims: To review empirical research that seeks to relate marginal increases in enforcement against the supply of illicit drugs to changes in drug prices at the level of the drug supply system being targeted.
Method: Review of empirical studies.
Findings: Although the fact of prohibition itself raises prices far above those likely to pertain in legal markets, there is little evidence that raising the risk of arrest, incarceration or seizure at different levels of the distribution system will raise prices at the targeted level, let alone retail prices. The number of studies available is small; they use a great variety of outcome and input measures and they all face substantial conceptual and empirical problems.
Conclusion: Given the high human and economic costs of stringent enforcement measures, particularly incarceration, the lack of evidence that tougher enforcement raises prices call into question the value, at the margin, of stringent supply-side enforcement policies in high-enforcement nations.
Method: Review of empirical studies.
Findings: Although the fact of prohibition itself raises prices far above those likely to pertain in legal markets, there is little evidence that raising the risk of arrest, incarceration or seizure at different levels of the distribution system will raise prices at the targeted level, let alone retail prices. The number of studies available is small; they use a great variety of outcome and input measures and they all face substantial conceptual and empirical problems.
Conclusion: Given the high human and economic costs of stringent enforcement measures, particularly incarceration, the lack of evidence that tougher enforcement raises prices call into question the value, at the margin, of stringent supply-side enforcement policies in high-enforcement nations.
Affiliation :
School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
Cote :
Abonnement